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Corporate governance in the private sector and 
corruption are important for economic development 
and private sector development. This paper investigates 
how corporate governance in private-sector media 
companies can affect public corruption. The analytical 
framework, based on models of corporate governance, 
identifies two channels through which media ownership 
concentration affects corruption: an owner effect, 
which discourages corruption and a competition-for-
control effect that enhances it. When the ownership 
structure of a newspaper has a majority shareholder, 
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the first effect dominates and corruption decreases as 
ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of 
majority shareholders. Without majority shareholders, 
the competition-for-control effect dominates and 
corruption increases with the concentration of ownership 
of the media company. Thus, the paper shows that 
cases of intermediate media-ownership concentration 
are the worst at promoting public accountability, while 
extreme situations, where the ownership is completely 
concentrated or widely held, can result in similar and 
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 1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized the cozy relationship between economic
progress and the development of good institutions. In Douglass North[26]’s
words, institutions are the rules of the game in a society that shape human
interactions through incentives. Therefore, institutions matter for economic
growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in a society.
A relevant institution of the civil and political society are the media,
because they control the ﬂows and the content of information provided to
voters. This paper presents a game theoretical model to discuss how and
when media is captured. In doing so, it brings into the analysis corporate
governance theory. The results provide new insights to regulate the industry.
The theoretical analysis rests on a two-period moral hazard voting model,
which adds to the standard framework a media sector, which provides endoge-
nously information about the incumbent to the electorate. As an innovation,
the model opens media ﬁrms and introduces a contest for corporate control,
which ﬁgures out the channel through which ownership concentration aﬀects
corruption.
Control of each media ﬁrm is determined in a shareholders’ meeting,
where large media shareholders submit competing proposals to capture the
votes of minority ones. The proposals are binding commitments on a mon-
etary payment that each large shareholder promises to distribute, as a div-
idend of the ﬁrm, in case he wins the control of the outlet and there is
no written story exposing the corrupt politician. This payment serves to
compensate minority owners for the proﬁts they lose when the controlling
shareholder accepts a bribe in exchange for the suppression of the news.
A key determinant of corruption in equilibrium is how much money the
corrupt politician has to pay to silence the media. Higher bribes decrease
the return to corruption and thereby the amount of stolen public funds. The
bribe has to compensate the money that the controlling shareholder loses
when he accepts to make the ﬁrm uninformative. This amount depends on
two components. The beneﬁts the shareholder loses as an owner of the ﬁrm,
and the compensation he has to pay to minority owners.
The eﬀect of ownership concentration on corruption can be decomposed
1into two diﬀerent eﬀects: a negative owner eﬀect, which discourages corrup-
tion, and a non-negative contest-for-control eﬀect, which enhances it. Specif-
ically, when the ownership structure of a media outlet is concentrated, there
is a majority owner, shareholders do not compete for corporate control. In-
stead, the main shareholder runs the company and he pays nothing to minor-
ity owners in case he suppresses the bad news. The contest-for-control eﬀect
is null, and because the bribe that the incumbent has to pay to capture a
media ﬁrm increases with the size of the main shareholder’s stake of shares,
corruption decreases as ownership concentrates.
By contrast, when the ownership structure is widely held, large sharehold-
ers compete for corporate control. In equilibrium, the largest owner wins the
contest, promising to the smaller ones a compensation for misreporting that
decreases with the size of his holding. This introduces a new type of tunnel-
ing problem, called the second-order tunnel, where the beneﬁts expropriated,
or more precisely, not payed to minority owners, are implicitly transferred
to the corrupt politician; fact that reduces the burden he has to pay to win
the re-election. In this case, the owner and the contest-for-control eﬀects
co-exist. However, since the latter eﬀect dominates, corruption increases as
ownership concentrates.
Therefore, the relationship between ownership concentration and corrup-
tion is non-monotonic. In this respect, cases of intermediate concentration
are the worst to promote accountability, while extreme situations, where the
ownership is completely concentrated or widely held, are likely to deliver
the same levels of corruption. The results stands in sharp contrast with the
conventional wisdom and constitutes overall the main contributions of this
work.
The case of Bosnian media provides an illustrative example of the owner
eﬀect. The story has been documented by the book Media Ownership and
its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism, and it refers to the Dnevni
Avaz, the main newspaper in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For a long time, the
paper has been the only one in the market, and there has been a lot of discus-
sion about its ﬁnance and political aﬃliation. However, it has been widely
claimed that Avaz, initially, was supported by the ruling Bosnian nation-
alist party SDA. Nevertheless, in 2000, its only owner, Fahrudin Radonic,
2distanced himself from the party in an attempt to establish an independent
daily. This move was severely punished by SDA oﬃcials, who used, with-
out success, various forms of pressure to put an end to his rebelion. The
fact that all the property of the newspaper was concentrated in one share-
holder prohibited the government from silencing the outlet and helped to
curb corruption.
The case of the Estonian media, at the beginning of the privatization
processes, illustrates the contest-for-control eﬀect. According to the same
source that documents the case of Bosnia, the Estonian media have played
an outstanding role in the transformation and liberalization of the civil and
political society. Privatization brings ownership diversiﬁcation, mainly in the
editorial teams, who became the owners of the newspapers. Press freedom
brought about joint ventures and agreements, which divide the market among
competing companies and shareholders. The process delivers independence,
pluralism and accountability.
The interest for the media industry has increased considerable in the last
years. In particular, during the last decade, the media industry of many
countries around the world has experienced remarkable changes, and even
though these changes have been aﬀected by each country’s idiosyncratic fac-
tors, most of the transformations in the industry have been characterized by
two worldwide trends: ownership and market concentration. In the U.S the
dominant trend has been the conglomeration of media ownership. To some
extent, this trend has been fueled by a desire to create lucrative vertical and
horizontal integrations. As a result, the press industry has experienced a
spectacular consolidation, which has left half a dozen major chains and a
handful of shareholders to rule the market.1
Similar trends have also been observed in Europe, where there has been
a constant push towards the consolidation of the sector. Concentration has
taken place not only in the market, but also in the ownership of publishing
ﬁrms. This process leaves few outlets and shareholders controlling the in-
1...”At the end of the World War II, 80 percent of the daily newspapers in U.S were
independently owned by chains. In 1981, twenty corporations controlled most of the
business of the country’s 11.000 magazines, but only seven years later, that number had
shrunk to three corporations.” Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, p.4.
3dustry. Some Western European media ﬁrms have been acquired by large
American media groups, while other Western European media groups have
bought old Eastern European media companies.2
The same process has also been evidenced in Latin America, even though
at a smaller scale. During the 1990s, the media industry of many countries
has become rather less dispersed. Concentration takes place at the hands
of domestic pre-existing media groups, which expand their holdings in the
industry.
Thus, what has been clear during these years, is that what every the
country around the world, the option of being a small- or middle-sized media
ﬁrm is hardly viable at present. Furthermore, despite the fact that there
are-literally speaking-thousands of titles across the world, in each country
these titles are controlled by a small number of shareholders.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper relates to diﬀerent strands of research. First, it is part of the
literature on media and political accountability. In this literature, we ﬁnd
the works by Besley and Prat[9], Corneo[12], Djankov[14], and Str¨ omberg
and Prat[28], which are closely related to this paper.
Besley and Prat[9] develop a model of democratic politics to analyze how
and when media is captured. They ﬁnd that pluralism provides an eﬀective
protection against media capture. Since the existence of a large number
of independent media ﬁrms make less likely that the government controls
news provision. They also ﬁnd that ownership concentration is related to
more corruption. Corneo[12] highlights the role played by ﬁrm ownership in
determining media independence. He shows that if voters vote over the level
of a productivity-enhancing public bad, then an increase in the concentration
of ﬁrm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely; while
Djankov et al.[14] examine the patterns of media ownership around the world.
The authors show that government ownership is associated with less press
2...” There is a clear issue of concern about the high levels of local, regional and na-
tional ownership concentration of newspapers in CEE countries. For example, the German
media giant WAZ has an European empire, with more than 130 newspapers.” European
Federation of Journalists, Eastern Empires, p.8.
4freedom, fewer political and economic rights, inferior governance, and inferior
social outcomes.
Str¨ omberg and Prat[28] analyze the eﬀect of liberalizing a country’s
broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens. They show
that people who start watching commercial TV news increase their level of
political knowledge more than those who do not; and that the positive infor-
mational eﬀects are particularly valuable since commercial TV news attracts
ex ante uniformed voters.
Another group of papers study the role of media to shape government re-
sponsiveness to citizens’ needs. In this strand of research we ﬁnd the works by
Besley and Burgess[8], who show that having a more informed and politically
active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive; and
that of Str¨ omberg[31], who ﬁnds that if better informed voters receive favor-
able policies, then the existence of mass media and/or the invention of a new
mass medium aﬀect public policy because mass media provide most of the
information people use in voting.
Second, the paper relates to the literature on the balance of power in
corporations with multiple (single) large shareholders. A common theme
of some of the papers in this strand of research (e.g., Berle and Means[6],
Jensen and Meckling[19], Grossman and Hart[16], Shleifer and Vishny[29],
Agrawal and Mandelke[2], Chen[11], and Gutierrez and Tribo[17] and Bloch
and Ulrich[10]) is that ownership concentration enhances ﬁrms’ performance.
However, it delivers higher levels of expropriation of minority shareholders’
proﬁts. This paper merges both strands of research and examines how cor-
porate governance aﬀects governmental corruption.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents evidence of the
importance of the forces that our formal framework identiﬁes. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 displays the equilibrium results. Section 5
analyzes extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
The aim of this section is to oﬀer some evidence that we think is suggestive
of the importance of the forces that our formal framework identiﬁes. We
5are interested in the existence of a negative owner eﬀect and a non-negative
contest for control eﬀect.
Data on media ownership is scarce. However, we extend the data of the
paper by Djankov et al.[14] to the year 2003. We perform this task according
to the availability of free and reliable information at the time to conduct the
extension. The new sample covers 28 middle- and high-income countries. For
each country, we have information on the ownership structure and market
shares of the top two newspapers, which in most of the cases compete for the
same market.3
The empirical illustration focuses on the case of the press industry, in-
stead on that of the T.V or radio ones, because it is in the ﬁrst industry
where the ownership structure of media ﬁrms experienced more changes.
The estimating equation is as follows:














+ΘXi + δZitγt + εit,
(1)
where Corrit denotes corruption in country i at time t; α1jit is the fraction
of shares owned by shareholder 1 from outlet j of country i at time t; α2jit is
the fraction of shares owned by shareholder 2 from outlet j of country i at
time t; Ijit denotes a dummy variable that equals 1 if outlet j of country i
in period t has no majority shareholder and 0 otherwise; Xi is a set of time
invariant variables, which capture ﬁxed eﬀects; Zit is a vector of time variant
countries’ characteristics; and αt are time eﬀects.
The ﬁrst term captures the sum of the owner eﬀects in the top two news-
papers of country i. The second term stands for the sum of the contest
for control eﬀects in the same newspapers. Each eﬀect measures the con-
testability of shareholders 1’ voting power. Xi and Zit control for previous
ﬁndings in the corruption literature, such as the ones provided by Ades and
Di Tella[1], La Porta et al.[22], Triesman[33], and Besley and Prat[9]. Thus,
Xi controls for legal origin, protestant traditions, federal states, ethnic and
3Newspapers are ranked according to readership ﬁgures.
6linguistic fractionalization,4 and democracy; while Zit includes the logarithm
of real GDP, an openness index, the sum of the market shares of the top
two newspapers, an index of voice and accountability, and daily newspapers
circulation.5 Table I presents the estimation results.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The sign and the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of interest are
as expected according to the theory. A one standard deviation increases
in α1jit generates, through the owner eﬀect, a -0.181 standard deviations
reduction in the perceived level of corruption. The same increment delivers,
through the contest for control eﬀect, a 0.191 standard deviations increase
in the dependent variable. Thus, the empirical illustration shows that if the
contest eﬀect is null, the owner eﬀect dominates and corruption decreases as
ownership concentrates. Otherwise, both eﬀects coexist but since the contest
eﬀect dominates, corruption increases as ownership concentrates.
A potential source of concern regarding the results of Table I is the reverse
causality problem. That is, rather than identifying the impact of ownership
concentration on corruption, we may be identifying the reverse eﬀect; as
corrupt politicians may have a greater incentive to promote the development
of highly concentrated ownership structures for media ﬁrms. To address this
problem, we instrument the owner eﬀect using an index of political stability,
which turns to be a valid instrument.6 We ﬁnd that we cannot reject the
exogeneity hypothesis. To conclude, the results provide evidence in line with
the theory.
4Because of data constrains, we assume the index is constant over the period 1999-2003.
5The Appendix contains a description of each variable and its source.
6Recall that to be a valid instrument, a variable has to satisfy three conditions. The ﬁrst
one requires that the variable be not correlated to the error term. The second condition
is that in the linear projection of the endogenous variable onto all exogenous regressors
the coeﬃcient of the instrumental variable be statistically diﬀerent from zero at least at
the 5% level. The third condition is the exclusion restriction, which demands that the
instrument does not aﬀect corruption through channels other than the owner eﬀect. We
provide in the appendix the results of each test.
73 The model
The model considers some ingredients of the retrospective voting model of
Besley and Prat[9], but it departures from that model in two directions. First,
because the focus of this paper is on the relationship between corruption and
ownership concentration, the model considers the opposite case to Besley and
Prat[9], the one in which there is only one ﬁrm in the market. As we explain
later, this is not a crucial assumption to prove the main results of the paper.
Second, the model opens media ﬁrms and incorporates corporate governance
theory in the analysis.
3.1 Set-up
The set-up consists of two periods. In the ﬁrst period, an incumbent is
exogenously in power. There are two possible types θ ∈ {b,g}, with Pr(θ =
g)= γ, where g stands for good and b for bad. A good incumbent delivers a
beneﬁt of 1 to voters. A bad incumbent extracts y ∈ [0,1] from the public
funds, obtains beneﬁts v(y), with v0(y) > 0 and v00(y) < 0, and delivers the
remainder, 1 − y, to voters.
Voters choose whether to re-elect the incumbent or a randomly selected
challenger, one that is good with probability γ. Voters do not known the
incumbent’s type, and they can not observe y before the election. However,
they can get information through the media in order to update their believes.
Voters buy news when media is informative. Before buying news, voters know
whether the media report something about the incumbent. However, they
ignore the content of the news.7
There is one media outlet. If the incumbent is bad, with probability ϕ(y),
the controlling shareholder receives a signal, where ϕ(y)
0 > 0, ϕ(y)
00 ≥ 0,
ϕ(0) = 0, and ϕ(1) = 1. If the signal is reported, the outlet makes proﬁts Π,
which are distributed proportionally among shareholders.
The incumbent can manipulate the news. This is modeled as a bargaining
game between the manager and the politician. Speciﬁcally, the incumbent
7We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that media do not report about the challenger.
This assumption does not alter the main result of the paper. A proof is available upon
author request.
8can make a non-negative oﬀer of money t to the controlling shareholder in
exchange for the suppression of the news. If the shareholder accepts this
oﬀer, he makes no report, and the incumbent gets beneﬁts v(y∗
2) − t if he is
re-elected, and −t if he is not.8
The media ﬁrm has two large shareholders, i = 1,2, and a continuum
of small ones. We denote by α1 and α2 the fractions of shares owned by
each shareholder. We assume α1 > α2. The remainder of the shares are
distributed uniformly among small owners.9
A shareholders’ meeting is annually convened in order to allocate con-
trol power. At the meeting, each large shareholder proposes a plan to run
the company. The plan of shareholder-i describes what fraction, xi ∈ [0,1],
of beneﬁts Π, shareholder-i will distribute as dividends of the ﬁrm, in case
he wins the control of the company and there is no written story exposing
the corrupt politician. This payment is intended to limit the payoﬀs that
the controlling shareholder can obtain by exploiting the informational ad-
vantage he has as he is the only one that receives the signal, and thereby the
only shareholder who can bargain with the incumbent in exchange for the
suppression of the news. The plans are binding commitments that will be
enshrined in the company’s charter and cannot be revoked by the controlling
shareholder.
Each share carries one vote and the controlling shareholder is elected
by simple majority of the votes eﬀectively cast.10 While the attendance of
large shareholders to the meeting is guarantee, this is not the case for small
shareholders, who face a cost, κΠ, with κ ∼ U on [0,1], for participating in
the meeting. The winner shareholder obtains extra rents, V , for being in
oﬃce.11
The timing of the game is as follows:
8y∗
2 stands for the equilibrium level of corruption in period 2.
9We assume this particular ownership structure because it is related to what the data
describe.
10To break ties, we assume that when two plans receive the same number of votes, the
largest shareholder wins the contest. Frequently, the largest stake-holder of a media ﬁrm
is the founder. Thus, this rule might reﬂect the power of the entrepreneur as the founder
of the organization. The same assumption can be found in Bennedsen and Wolfenzon[5].
11These rents guarantee that large shareholders always want to participate in the contest.
91. Large shareholders compete to become the manager of the media. Each
shareholder proposes xi ∈ [0,1], for i = 1,2, and all shareholders vote.
The manager is elected.
2. The incumbent’s type θ is realized. If θ = g the manager observes no
signal. If θ = b, with probability ϕ(y), the manager receives a signal.
The incumbent observes the signal and selects a transfer t ≥ 0.
3. The manager observes the transfer t and decides whether to accept t
or to reject it. If he accepts t, he suppresses the bad news. If he rejects
t, he reports about the incumbent.
4. Voters decide whether to buy news and they vote for the incumbent or
the challenger.
4 Equilibrium
We solve the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and we restrict the
solution of the corporate game to strong equilibrium, i.e equilibria such that
no group of agents with positive measure has an incentive to deviate. The
following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.12
Proposition 1 In the pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium of the game, the following
occurs:
1. Voters vote for the challenger if they observe a report about the incum-
bent and re-elect the incumbent otherwise.
2. Shareholder 1 becomes the controlling shareholder of the outlet. He
proposes x∗
1 = 0 if α1 ≥ 0.5, and x∗
1 = 1 −
(α1−α2)
(1−α1−α2) if α1 < 0.5.
3. The controlling shareholder accepts t if and only if t ≥ [α1Π + (1 −
α1)x∗
1Π].
4. A bad incumbent oﬀers t = [α1Π+(1−α1)x∗
1Π] if shareholder 1 observes
the bad signal and v(1) ≥ t.
12The Appendix presents the proofs.
105. In the second period, y = 1. In the ﬁrst one, y satisﬁes the following
condition:
v0(y) − ϕ0(y)v(1) + ϕ0(y)max(0,v(1) − [α1Π + (1 − α1)x∗
1Π]) = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that media capture is a function of the ownership struc-
ture of the ﬁrm. When the ownership structure has a majority owner, the
bribe equals the beneﬁts the shareholder loses for making the newspaper un-
informative, α1Π. When no shareholder has the majority of the company’s
votes, the bribe equals α1Π + (1 − α1)x∗
1Π. The ﬁrst term captures the ben-
eﬁts the shareholder loses as owner of the ﬁrm. The second term reﬂects the
compensation he has to pay to minority owners. This payment is a decreas-




The proposition also shows that ownership concentration, which is mea-
sured by the size of shareholder 1’s stock, aﬀects corruption through two
diﬀerent channels. The ﬁrst one is called the owner eﬀect,
−ϕ0(y)Π
[−v00(y) + ϕ00(y)v(1) − ϕ00(y)max(0,v(1) − t)]
,






[−v00(y) + ϕ00(y)v(1) − ϕ00(y)max(0,v(1) − t)]
.
The ﬁrst eﬀect is negative and underlines the fact that when there is a ma-
jority owner, corruption decreases as ownership concentrates. The impact of
this eﬀect reﬂects how the alignment of interests in the private sector im-
proves accountability in the public area. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
paper that identiﬁes this eﬀect. Other papers by Berle and Means[6], Jensen
and Meckling[19], Grossman and Hart[16], Shleifer and Vishny[29], Agrawal
and Mandelke[2], Chen[11], and Gutierrez and Tribo[17] document a positive
impact of ownership concentration on private sector’s performance.
11The second eﬀect is either zero or positive depending on the ownership
structure of the ﬁrm. If shareholder 1 owns more than 50% of the company,
the eﬀect is null. If shareholder 1 owns less than 50% of the ﬁrm, the eﬀect
is positive. This eﬀect relates three remarkable ingredients of the problem
we study, which in turn characterize the links between the private and the
public sector. The elements are the following: contestability of shareholder
1’s voting power, expropriation of minority owners’ beneﬁts, and cost for the
corrupt politician to silence the media.
When the ownership structure is widely held, large shareholders compete
for corporate control. In equilibrium, the largest owner wins the contest,
promising to the smaller shareholders a compensation that decreases with the
size of his stock. This introduces a new type of tunneling problem, called a
second-order tunnel, where the beneﬁts expropriated, or more speciﬁcally not
payed to minority owners, are implicitly transferred to the corrupt politician;
fact that reduces the burden he has to pay to win his re-election.
If α1 ≥ 0.5, the owner eﬀect dominates and corruption decreases as own-
ership concentrates. Otherwise, the contest-for-control eﬀect prevails and
corruption increases as ownership concentrates. The following proposition
characterizes the corruption function in equilibrium. For such purpose, let









v(1)+1)]} and ˆ α11 ≡
v(1)
Π .
Proposition 2 Corruption is a non-monotonic function of ownership con-
centration. Increasing and concave in the interval [ˆ α10,0.5). Decreasing and
concave in the interval [0.5, ˆ α11). Constant in the interval [0, ˆ α10) U (ˆ α11,1].
Corollary 1 Assume 0 < ˆ α10 ≤ 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ ˆ α11 < 1. The maximum level







Corollary 2 Assume 0 < ˆ α10 ≤ 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ ˆ α11 < 1. Extreme cases
where the ownership is completely concentrated or widely held deliver the






Three results make proposition 2 relevant for the debate on media regulation.
The ﬁrst one shows that contrary to the conventional wisdom, corruption is a
non-monotonic function of ownership concentration. The second result points
out that under certain conditions, intermediate situations, where the main
shareholder has 50% of the shares of the company, are the worst to promote
accountability. The third ﬁnding shows that extreme cases can deliver the
same level of corruption.
Thus, the ﬁndings remark that conventional prescriptions on ownership
concentration may not be appropriate when it comes to an industry such
as the media. This is because policies designed to promote competition
must take into account not only economic welfare considerations, but also
accountability eﬀects.
5 Extensions
This section analyzes the robustness of the results to changes in the assump-
tions of the model. First, we explore the case where there are N outlets in
the market. Second, we study a situation where large shareholders have more
available actions than in the baseline model to decide who controls the ﬁrm.
Finally, we investigate the case of ideological media.
5.1 N outlets in the market
Assume there are N outlets in the market, each one with an ownership struc-
ture similar to the one previously described. The outlets receive the same
signal. The readers are distributed equally among informative outlets.
In equilibrium, it is a dominated strategy for the incumbent to silence
partially the market. Because he will not be re-elected, but he will have to
pay some bribes. Therefore, if the incumbent wants to win the re-election he
has to pay to the controlling shareholder of each ﬁrm a bribe equivalent to
the one the shareholder would require if his outlet were the only one in the


























5.2 Actions to decide who controls the ﬁrm
Assume now, that large shareholders can buy shares rather than make a
proposal to minority owners at the time to compete for corporate control.
If this possibility were available, we would obtain in equilibrium that one of
the two large shareholders wins the contest paying an equilibrium price, p∗,
per vote he buys.
When this shareholder receives a bad signal, he has to decide whether
to make or not a report about the incumbent. In doing so, he compares
the beneﬁts he would obtain in each case. If he rejects the bribe t, he gets a
payment 0.5Π−(0.5−αi)p∗. If he accepts the transfer t, he obtains a payment
t−(0.5−αi)p∗. In both situations, the shareholder pays the cost of winning
the contest, and the equilibrium bribe, 0.5Π, is independent of the ownership
structure. This result contradicts the empirical ﬁnding by Djankov et al.[14],
who show that corruption is a dependent function of ownership concentration.
It is therefore because of this reason that we exclude the possibility of buying
shares from our main set-up.
Consider next, the case where shareholders collude or compete. In any
case, shareholder 1 receives the signal about the incumbent, and he decides
whether to make a take it or leave oﬀer to shareholder 2. If both sharehold-
ers collude, they pay nothing to the rest of the owners, and shareholder 1
bargains with the incumbent for a payment in exchange of the suppression
of the news.
The equilibrium compensation that shareholder 1 proposes to shareholder
2, in order to collude, is α2(1 −
(α1−α2)
(1−α1−α2)). This is the minimum payment
that shareholder 1 has to make to have shareholder 2 accepting the collusion.
Shareholder 1 asks for a bribe equal to that of the baseline model, and he
14always prefers to collude because he can get extra positive rents equal to




Assume, as in Besley and Prat[9], that the electorate is divided in left and
right voters. Left voters are a fraction 1 − p > 0.5 of the population. The
remainder proportion, p > 0.5, are right wingers. Voters are also divided
according to their incentives to buy news. A proportion ρ of the them values
ideology over information. They buy the newspaper if media share the same
ideological preference. The other proportion, 1 − ρ, prioritizes information;
and the voters that belong to this group buy news if media is informative.
The outlet obtains a beneﬁt (loss) B from having (not having) a politician
of its preferred (non-preferred) ideology in oﬃce. Large shareholders compete
for corporate control. At the meeting, each large shareholder proposes a
plan to run the company. The plan of shareholder-i describes what fraction,
xi ∈ [0,1], of beneﬁts [Π(1−ρ)−Bd+B(1−d)], shareholder-i will distribute
as dividends of the ﬁrm, in case he wins the control of the company, and
there is no written story exposing the corrupt politician; where d stands for
a dummy that equals 1 if the politician in oﬃce shares the same ideology as
that of the newspaper and 0 otherwise.
In the equilibrium of the game, shareholder 1 becomes the controlling
shareholder of the outlet. He proposes x∗
1 = 0 if α1 ≥ 0.5, and x∗
1 = 1 −
(α1−α2)
(1−α1−α2) if α1 < 0.5. The shareholder accepts to suppress the bad news
if and only if he receives a transfer t that at least compensates him for
the loses he faces when he decides to make the newspaper uninformative,
[α1 + (1 − α1)x∗
1][Π(1 − ρ) − dB + B(1 − d)]. The corrupt politician silences
the outlet if and only if υ(1) ≥ [α1 + (1 − α1)x∗
1][Π(1 − ρ) − dB + B(1 − d)].
The results of Proposition 2 hold. However, ˆ α10 =
v(1)
[Π(1−ρ)−dB+B(1−d)] and











This paper presents a model to examine the relationship between corruption
in the public sector and concentration of the ownership structure of media
ﬁrms. The main result of the paper shows that the relationship between cor-
ruption and ownership concentration is non-monotonic, with extreme cases,
where the ownership is completely concentrated or widely held, likely to de-
liver the same levels of corruption. Thus, the paper shows that conventional
regulatory prescriptions on ownership concentration may not be appropriate
when it comes to industries such as the media. This is because the pre-
scriptions must take into account not only economic welfare considerations,
but also accountability eﬀects. In this respect, ownership concentration may
harm neither media freedom nor public accountability; this fact contradicts
the conventional wisdom, and therefore constitutes overall the main contri-
bution of this work.
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197 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The structure of the proof follows Besley and Prat[9]. We borrow the
proof for the equilibrium of the corporate game from Bloch and Hege[10].
To prove that voters do not play weakly dominated strategies, let’s analyze
their behavior. The only information voters receive about the incumbent
is through the media. Kicking out the incumbent if media make a report
is a strictly dominant strategy. Therefore, what remains to be proved is
that voters do not kicked out the incumbent if media make no report. For
such purpose, notice that if this situation happens, voters do not buy news.
However, they up-date their believes. The posterior on the incumbent’s type
is as follows:
P(θ = b | a = nr) =
P(θ = b)P(a = nr | θ = b)
P(θ = g)P(a = nr | θ = g) + P(θ = b)P(a = nr | θ = b)
,
where a is an element of the set of available actions for the controlling
shareholder,{r,nr}, and r stands for reporting while nr stands for the con-
trary action. This probability can be re-written in the following manner:
P(θ = b | a = nr) =
γP
(1 − γ) + γP
.
Because the posterior about the incumbent,
γP
(1−γ)+γP, is lower than the prior
about the challenger, γ, voters do not kicked out the incumbent if there is
no report.
Now let’s consider the interaction between the incumbent and the con-
trolling shareholder. If controlling shareholder i accepts to suppress the bad
news, he receives a payoﬀ t−(1−αi)x∗
iΠ. Otherwise, he yields αiΠ. There-
fore, shareholder i accepts t if and only if t ≥ [αiΠ + (1 − αi)x∗
iΠ]. And, the
corrupt politician silences the outlet if and only if v(1) ≥ αiΠ+(1−αi)x∗
iΠ.
As any elected politician will not be removed from oﬃce in the second
period, y of period 2 is equal to 1. In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent chooses
y to maximize his expected utility:
20v(y) + (1 − ϕ(y))v(1) + ϕ(y)(max(0,v(1) − t)),
subject to
t = [αiΠ + (1 − αi)x
∗
iΠ].




0(y)max(0,v(1) − t) = 0




00(y)max(0,v(1) − t) < 0
Given the solution to the incumbent’s problem, let’s analyze the equilib-
rium of the corporate control game. Because voting is costly, it is a dominant
strategy for small shareholders not to participate in the meeting when their
preferences agree with those of the largest shareholder. Therefore, the only
situation where the votes of small shareholders matter is when they favor
the proposal of the second largest owner. Speciﬁcally, shareholder 2 wins
the contest if and only if he attracts the votes of a fraction α1−α2
1−α1−α2 of small
shareholders. This requires that a proportion α1−α2
1−α1−α2 of those sharehold-
ers ﬁnd x2Π − κΠ ≥ x1Π. Because κ is uniformly distributed on [0,1], this
condition can be written as follows:
x1 ≤ x2 −
α1 − α2
(1 − α1 − α2)
. (2)





(1−α1−α2),1) when α1 < 0.5 consider Figure I.
[Insert Figure I about here]
By employing the last condition we can divide the plane into two re-
gions. Region A where shareholder 1 wins the contest and region B where
shareholder 2 does.
21We ﬁrst claim that there cannot be an equilibrium that belongs to region
B. To understand this statement notice that whenever x1 = 1, shareholder
1 wins the contest. Hence, for any point in region B, shareholder 1 has a
proﬁtable deviation. And thereby it can not be an equilibrium in region B.
Now consider a point in region A, with x1 ≤ x∗
1. As x1 ≤ x∗
1, x2 satisﬁes
the following condition x2 > 0. By choosing x2 = 1, shareholder 2 wins the
contest. Hence, for any point in region A, shareholder 2 has a proﬁtable
deviation.
Finally, consider a point in region A where x2 > 0 and x1 > x∗
1. Because
shareholder 1’s utility decreases in x1, his proposal has to be the minimum
that guarantees to win the contest. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium
is: (x∗
1,x∗
2) = (1 −
(α1−α2)
((1−α1−α2)),1). The case α1 ≥ 0.5 is trivial, and for this
reason we omit the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider ﬁrst the case where α1 ≥ 0.5. At α1 =
v(1)
Π , the incumbent
is indiﬀerent between silencing or not the newspaper. For α1 ≥
v(1)
Π , the
owner eﬀect dominates, and the incumbent does not silence the newspaper.




For 0.5 ≤ α1 ≤
v(1)
Π , the incumbent captures the media, and the ﬁrst order













v(1))0.5 − α2( Π
v(1) + 1)]}, the incumbent is indiﬀerent between silencing
or not the newspaper. For 1 + α2
2 −
v(1)
2Π − {2 + [1
2(
v(1)




v(1) + 1)]} < α1 < 0.5, the contest for control eﬀect dominates, and the
incumbent captures the media. Corruption satisﬁes:
v
0(y) − ϕ
0(y)[α1 + (1 − α1)(1 −
(α1 − α2)
(1 − α1 − α2)
)]Π = 0.
22For 0 < α1 ≤ 1 + α2
2 −
v(1)
2Π − {2 + [1
2(
v(1)
Π )0.5 − 1
2α2( Π
v(1))0.5 − α2( Π
v(1) + 1)]},









Contest for corporate control effect 0.444
[0.147]***
Market share of the top two newspapers -0.577
[0.9183]








Voice & Accountability index -1.174
[0.295]***








English legal origin -3.712
[0.745]***
French legal origin -0.774
[0.372]
German legal origin -1.908
[0.673]





Num. of observations 56
Table 1. Estimation Results
Explanatory variables
Corruption
Note: The dependent variable is the perceived level of corruption from 
ICRG. The omited category for the legal origen variable is Socialism. The 
omited category is non-federal state. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***: 




Political stability  -0.475
[0.148]***
Contest for corporate control effect 0.003
[0.120]
Market share of the top two newspapers -0.044
[0.264]








Voice & Accountability index 0.178
[0.200]








English legal origin 0.131
[0.665]
French legal origin 1.069
[0.598]*
German legal origin 0.566
[0.500]





Num. of observations 56
Table 2. Testing the Goodness of Political Stability as an IV 
Explanatory variables
Owner effect
Note: The dependent variable is the "owner effect". The omited category 
for the legal origen variable is Nordic. The omited category is non-federal 
state. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: 






Contest for corporate control effect 0.368
[0.128]***
Market share of the top two newspapers -0.555
[0.932]








Voice & Accountability index -1.144
[0.263]***








English legal origin -3.166
[0.899]***
French legal origin -0.765
[0.357]**
German legal origin -1.688
[0.670]**





Num. of observations 56
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Media Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence and 
Pluralism 
http://www.novinar.com/upload/EIM-EP-REPORT-2004.pdf 
Amadeus data base 
http://www.baltkurs.com/english/archive/01/port.htm 
The World Bank 
LITHUANIA 
Media Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence and 
Pluralism 
http://www.novinar.com/upload/EIM-EP-REPORT-2004.pdf 
The World Bank 
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Media Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence and 
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The World Bank 
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The World Bank 
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Is an index of perceived corruption based on the extent high government officials are
expected to demand specialpayments.Illegalpayments are generally expected in the form
of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, taxassessment,
policy protection, or loans. The index ranges from 1 to 6, with lower values indicating less 
alpha_1
This variable corresponds to the "ultimate controlling shareholder" in Djankov et al. [14]. 
When the ownership structure of a firm is direct,  there is no chain of firms controlling the 
newspaper,  the variable reflects the fraction of shares owned by the main shareholder of 
the firm. Otherwise, the variable captures the fraction of shares owned by the shareholder 
that at the end of the chain of control commands thenewspaper. Source: see details for 
media variables. 
alpha_2
This variable captures the size of the second largest owner. Source: see details for media 
variables. 
Market share
This variable measures the accumulated market shares of the top two newspapers of each 
country. Source: see details for media variables. 
Logarithm of real GDP Logarithm of real GDP. Source: Penn World Tables. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu.
Openess  Total trade as a percentage of GDP. Source: Penn World Tables.
Democracy index
values indicating lower levels of democracy. Annually available. Source: Polity IV Data 
Sets. CIDCIM. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity.
Federal state Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a country has a federal state and 0 otherwise.
Voice & Accountability index
Index that identifies the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
Daily newspapers circulation Daily circulation per thounsands of inhabitants. Source: UNDP.
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
Indexes of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. 2002. 
Fractionalization. Harvard Institute of Economic Research. Discussion Paper 1959.
Protestant traditions Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the
Legal origin Source: La Porta et al. (1999).




Country Year Size of Shareholder 1 Size of Shareholder 2 Size of Shareholder 1 Size of Shareholder 2 Market Share Outlet 1 and 2
ARGENTINA 1999 1 0 0.44 0.1 0.4
ARGENTINA 2003 0.82 0.18 0.66 0.1 0.38
AUSTRALIA 1999 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.32
AUSTRALIA 2003 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.41
AUSTRIA 1999 0.51 0.49 1 0 0.48
AUSTRIA 2003 0.5 0.28 0.98 0.02 0.78
BELGIUM 1999 1 0 0.47 0.4 0.37
BELGIUM 2003 1 0 0.6 0.28 0.37
CANADA 1999 0.5 0.5 0.73 0.27 0.15
CANADA 2003 0.5 0.5 0.69 0.32 0.15
CHILE 1999 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.26
CHILE 2003 0.75 0.1 0.75 0.1 0.31
CROACIA 2003 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.66
CROACIA 1999 0.6 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.66
FINLAND 2003 0.27 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.29
FINLAND 1999 0.43 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.71
FRANCE 2003 0.96 0.05 0.82 0.13 0.38
FRANCE 1999 1 0 0.75 0.25 0.1
GREECE 2003 0.5 0.09 0.35 0.19 0.28
GREECE 1999 0.59 0.06 0.7 0.05 0.45
HUNGARY 2003 1 0 0.49 0.27 0.25
HUNGARY 1999 0.67 0.27 0.44 0.05 0.41
INDIA 2003 1 0 1 0 0.1
INDIA 1999 1 0 1 0 0.1
LATVIA 1999 0.51 0.04 1 0 0.41
LATVIA 2003 0.7 0.14 0.39 0.1 0.35
LITHUANIA 2003 0.4 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.41
LITHUANIA 1999 0.41 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.34
MALAWI 2003 1 0 1 0 1
MALAWI 1999 1 0 1 0 1
MEXICO 2003 1 0 1 0 0.2
MEXICO 1999 1 0 1 0 0.2
NEW ZEALAND 2003 1 0 0.14 0.05 0.39
NEW ZEALAND 1999 0.27 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.39
Outlet 1  Outlet 2Country Year Size of Shareholder 1 Size of Shareholder 2 Size of Shareholder 1 Size of Shareholder 2 Market Share Outlet 1 and 2
PERU 2003 1 0 1 0 0.3
PERU 1999 1 0 1 0 0.3
PORTUGAL 2003 0.5 0.55 0.09 0.06 0.28
PORTUGAL 1999 0.51 0.05 0.33 0.33 0.21
ROMANIA 1999 1 0 0.5 0.05 0.4
ROMANIA 2003 1 0 0.81 0.05 0.43
SLOVAK 2003 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.33
SLOVAK 1999 1 0 0.3 0.05 0.44
SLOVENIA 1999 0.6 0.05 0.6 0.05 0.59
SLOVENIA 2003 0.25 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.51
SPAIN 2003 1 0 0.79 0.05 0.17
SPAIN 1999 0.52 0.05 1 0 0.21
SWEEDEN 2003 0.26 0.1 0.26 0.1 0.2
SWEEDEN 1999 0.26 0.1 0.65 0.05 0.2
SWITZERLAND 2003 0.51 0.14 1 0 0.23
SWITZERLAND 1999 1 0 0.01 0 0.23
UNITED KINGDOM 1999 0.32 0.05 0.6 0.23 0.31
UNITED KINGDOM 2003 0.32 0.05 0.63 0.23 0.44
UNITED STATES 2003 0.85 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.06
UNITED STATES 1999 0.85 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.06
VENEZUELA 2003 1 0 1 0 0.15
VENEZUELA 1999 1 0 1 0 0.15
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